In 2020, the Rwandan government arrested Paul Rusesabagina, a hotel manager praised for his efforts sheltering Hutu and Tutsi refugees during the 1994 genocide. A vocal critic of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Rusesabagina was kidnapped during a trip to Dubai and returned to Rwanda on charges of terrorism.
Roughly one year later, Rusesabagina’s daughter was one of over 3,000 journalists, activists, and politicians who –– both within the country and internationally –– were spied on by the Rwandan government with Israeli-based Pegasus software.
The Rusesabagina case is by no means an anomaly. Rather, it is a window into a broader system of repression that the Rwandan state has built in the decades since a devastating civil war and the ascension of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
Once a staple of colonial rule, repression has evolved to incorporate new technologies and transcend borders.
The authoritarian lasso is a new phenomenon that uses digital technologies of the modern era to blur the boundaries between domestic and international space.
The actions of the RPF may be understood by the imperial boomerang, a phenomenon where colonial methods of repression are adapted and applied by governments over their own citizens, long after colonizers had gone.
The “authoritarian lasso,” while related, operates differently. The authoritarian lasso is a new phenomenon that uses digital technologies of the modern era to blur the boundaries between domestic and international space.
The authoritarian lasso reveals how colonial methods like surveillance are used not only on their citizens but also on critics abroad. By surveilling domestic and international adversaries, Rwanda ropes them back into a regime narrative that frames dissent as an existential threat to post-genocide unity.
The Lasso Effect in Rwanda
State surveillance domestically has been largely situated within digital domains. Across the country, the RPF has created state surveillance so that it can access all facets of citizen life, ensuring the regime is felt at the most local levels.
Digital surveillance, for example, is becoming normalized — from the expansion of CCTV systems in Kigali to the installation of cameras along major highways.
These technologies are touted as investments in national security and unity. However, they serve the dual purpose of making the state visible while making people feel they are being watched.
Another example of the authoritarian lasso is artificial intelligence that profiles citizens and watches their behavior on social media and other online platforms. In 2024, the Rwandan Utilities Regulatory Authority introduced new biometric requirements to register for SIM cards, all but ensuring citizens cannot exist on the internet without the state knowing.
International actors have created a deeply interconnected surveillance landscape, where states like Rwanda have woven technologies and political strategies into their repressive apparatus.
Internationally, the RPF has aggressively pursued perceived threats through fear. As early as 1996, the Rwandan state was implicated in assassinations of Rwandan elites living abroad.
In 2010, three founders of the Rwanda National Congress, an exiled opposition group, were convicted in absentia on charges of terrorism.
Who’s Behind the Authoritarian Lasso?
The growth of digital technologies like surveillance software and AI has only expanded the repressive toolkit available to the RPF. International actors and institutions are critical threads of this system.
Chinese companies, for instance, have been instrumental in expanding the surveillance state. Eleven African countries –– including Rwanda –– have spent billions of dollars procuring Chinese facial recognition and car-tracking technologies. Rwanda has also pursued direct partnerships with Chinese firms to strengthen its information and communications technology capabilities.
Beijing offers more than material support for Rwanda and other authoritarian governments. Increasingly, China’s ideological basis for digital repression –– known as “internet sovereignty” –– legitimizes government control of cyberspace, expanding state power over the lives of citizens.
The RPF, long styling itself the sole protector of Rwanda, is more than happy to embrace an internet sovereignty narrative to consolidate its control.
Digital repression hinges on interactions between domestic political interests, developmental needs, and global technological markets.
Authoritarian regimes are not the only partners in upholding digital repression. The European Union has been criticized for its sale of surveillance technologies to non-democratic regimes. Poland in particular exports telecommunication interception systems to Rwanda. The United States supplies technologies to 32 countries, many of which have authoritarian regimes.
Within the International Criminal Police Organization, or Interpol, (INTERPOL), Rwanda has positioned itself as a partner in global efforts to tackle cybercrime while simultaneously abusing the organization’s extradition systems to track dissidents, often under the guise of genocide-related offenses.
Together, these international actors have created a deeply interconnected surveillance landscape, where states like Rwanda have woven technologies and political strategies into their repressive apparatus.
Cutting the Lasso
Opportunities for challenging the digital surveillance apparatus in and outside Rwanda remain limited.
Mass surveillance is exhausting and difficult to contest. In the digital space, Rwandans limit their technology use to avoid scrutiny from officials, opting to discuss sensitive political topics in closed settings.
But it is this same culture of silence that creates opportunities for resistance.
Actors such as the U.S. and European Union cannot absolve themselves of the responsibility to prevent their digital technologies from enhancing repression in non-democratic states.
Some citizens don’t participate in community meetings and limit engagement on digital platforms to undermine the state’s ability to read them. By depriving the state access to data, Rwandans evade the systemization that streamlines authoritarian governance.
Nevertheless, these limited tactics of resistance underscore the lack of agency afforded to Rwandan citizens under the RPF surveillance state.
Resistance must not only come from within, however. The Rwandan example demonstrates the expansiveness of digital repression, as well as the culpability of international actors in its perpetuation.
The Stanford Cyber Policy Center recommends collaboration among democratic states and their private sectors to enhance data governance and security. While this is a start, it quickly collapses in authoritarian settings like Rwanda, where the state enjoys unparalleled influence.
Pulling Apart the Threads
Digital repression is also deeply intertwined with regime legitimacy. The RPF uses technology not simply to eliminate regime challengers, but to assist in maintaining the narrative that justifies its domination in Rwanda.
Just as technology constrains opposition, it can also be used to cultivate it.
To cut the lasso of authoritarian digital repression, the global community must acknowledge the threads of the problem. Digital repression hinges on interactions between domestic political interests, developmental needs, and global technological markets. Addressing just one of these threads is not enough.
It is past time the global community addressed the scourge of digital repression together –– and cut the lasso that bound Rusesabagina five years ago.
In 2021 — a year after Rusesabagina’s kidnapping — U.N. experts called for a moratorium on the sale of life-threatening surveillance technologies, including the Pegasus spyware used to track and intimidate thousands of Rwandans. They appealed to international governments and companies to more carefully monitor the applications of their digital platforms, recognizing the interconnectedness of modern-day repressive systems.
Five years later, this recommendation has not materialized in any wide-ranging action by the U.N. or any other international organization.
Actors such as the U.S. and European Union cannot absolve themselves of the responsibility to prevent their digital technologies from enhancing repression in non-democratic states. As the world becomes increasingly linked, digital repression becomes a global project, dependent on international assistance or inaction to sustain repressive networks.
In addition, dissidents and civil society organizations can redouble their efforts to make the RPF regime visible in and outside of Rwanda. Social media and other online platforms are far-reaching staging grounds for counter-narratives that expose RPF oppression. Regime critics must flood the digital space with their stories to lift the lid on RPF oppression and to drive change.
It is past time the global community addressed the scourge of digital repression together –– and cut the lasso that bound Rusesabagina five years ago.
