In January 2026, the Trump administration ended funding for dozens of international organizations, conventions, and treaties, including 31 United Nations bodies. The administration justified the move as necessary because participation was “contrary to the interests of the United States,” describing the organizations as  “anti-American, useless, or wasteful.”

To be sure, the decision has put the UN’s architecture under severe strain at a time when it is trying to cope with simultaneous armed conflicts, humanitarian crises, climate change, and the governance of emerging technologies. But even as U.S. disengagement has significantly complicated matters inside the UN, it has not entirely spelled the end of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Other countries are increasingly cutting deals with smaller groups of like-minded partners, suggesting that multilateralism might still produce results even without American leadership.

Nowhere is that more consequential than for science and technology governance, where the rules being written now will shape the next decade.

A Financial Crisis Long in the Making

The UN was in a dire financial situation before Trump’s return. For years, the organization has been struggling with a liquidity crisis largely driven by late payments from the U.S. and China, its two biggest contributors. 

By the time Trump was inaugurated for the second time, the U.S. already owed more than $3 billion in late payments to the general budget — and billions more in voluntary contributions to specific UN agencies and programs. Now that those contributions have ended, the UN is left to do more with less.

The funding cuts are already being felt, including in the bodies that underpin global science and technology governance. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for instance, has lost U.S. contributions, which made up about 30% of its voluntary funding. 

Multilateralism can function without the U.S., particularly on issues that developing countries care about most.

Moreover, some U.S. scientists have reportedly not been allowed to attend the IPCC’s plenary meetings, leaving the assessment reports that directly feed into global climate action increasingly short of both money and expertise.

The funding crisis is forcing a fundamental rethink of how the UN operates. Secretary-General António Guterres has proposed merging agencies — such as integrating the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the UN Environment Programme, or combining the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS into the World Health Organization (WHO).

While some reforms might be long overdue, the risks for science governance are real. Folding the UNFCCC, the primary international treaty to combat climate change, into a broader environmental body risks sacrificing decades of expertise and undermining momentum on climate action for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency.

China Moves into the Vacuum

The vacuum the U.S. has created is allowing China to capitalize on the many crises facing the UN. Beijing has stepped up its presence in scientific and institutional areas where the U.S. has pulled back, including making a $500 million pledge to the WHO.

China is also using the opening to shape the norms governing emerging technologies. For years, it has worked through UN bodies to advance a vision of digital governance aligned with its domestic model of state sovereignty over data flows and internet infrastructure. Now it has proposed a Global AI Governance Initiative to place the UN at the center of international AI development, security, and governance. With the U.S. rejecting multilateral AI governance initiatives, China has significant leeway to shape AI norms before international consensus emerges.

The US Won’t Pay but Still Wants to Play

The UN can only ever be as ambitious as its members want it to be — and the U.S. is now using its seat at the table to slow progress on climate and technology governance while declining to help pay for any of it.

At the General Assembly, U.S. delegates are actively speaking against references to the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change, and calling for votes on resolutions that previously passed by consensus.

The effects extend well beyond New York. The 2026 UN Climate Change Conference was notably weaker than its predecessor, with fewer world leaders attending and no agreement on fossil fuel language. The U.S. also successfully pushed for the postponement of a global shipping emissions levy at the International Maritime Organization.

Coalitions of the Willing

Yet other countries are learning to move forward without Washington.

The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville, Spain, last year illustrated that other countries are still willing to work together. After the U.S. walked out of negotiations, the remaining members delivered an outcome anyway. Their collaboration was an early signal that multilateralism can function without the U.S., particularly on issues that developing countries care about most.

While coalitions of the willing can move faster and further, they also risk excluding countries from norm-setting processes — nowhere more so than on AI, where just seven developed countries currently participate in all major international governance frameworks, leaving 118 countries without a seat at the table.

The UN’s universality remains indispensable for setting global norms and standards. Whether its current crisis accelerates its reform or its decline may depend less on Washington than on whether the rest of its members can keep multilateralism alive in the meantime. 

As crises pile up, the rest of the world cannot afford to wait for the U.S. to decide whether to show up. And in its effort to put America first, Washington might find itself last.