Global affairs are rapidly changing. Over the past two decades we have observed a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, marked by aggressive revisionism and the erosion of the rules-based international order by authoritarian regimes. We have also observed a rapid technological transformation driven by artificial intelligence. These changes amplify the need to access reliable, stable, and resilient energy sources.

The warning signs of aggressive revisionism were visible in Vladimir Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference speech when he argued that Russia would not play second fiddle in the world order. This perspective became unmistakable with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. The goal was clear: consolidate an authoritarian alliance and launch a hybrid war against the liberal, rules-based international order. 

Dominance over access to hydrocarbon reserves and their distribution networks has become one of the most effective weaponized segments of Russia’s hybrid coercion. Europe’s dependence on Russian energy both emboldened the Kremlin and constrained collective responses, enabling energy to be weaponized alongside diplomacy, trade, and information.

These challenges have elevated the need for greater national resilience, defined as a nation’s ability to respond to multiple contingencies on short notice and to withstand and rapidly recover from disruptions. 

Resilience is now central to great-power competition. Once rooted  primarily in military preparedness, it now encompasses civilian infrastructure and economic continuity. As critical infrastructure—assets, facilities, and networks that provide essential services and public well-being—has become a target in modern conflict, energy security has emerged as foundational. Electrification now underpins nearly every aspect of modern life.

Small states are at a cross-roads: they must choose to remain passive consumers of security, relying on energy reserves from large countries like Russia, or they must become active contributors to the global security architecture by securing autonomous, resilient energy systems.

Energy Infrastructure is Power

Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in 2022 crystallized how centralized energy infrastructure can be a target in modern warfare. In this case, a stable, secure, and resilient energy supply became a top-tier national security concern. When the ZNPP weakened, so did Ukraine’s energy independence. 

Neither the attacks nor the effects ended there. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is interdependent with Europe’s energy security. Ongoing attacks on Ukrainian power systems therefore threaten not only Ukraine’s sovereignty but also Europe’s resilience. The war has shattered Russia’s image as a “reliable energy supplier” and accelerated Europe’s search for alternatives. 

 For small states, this presents a choice: remain passive consumers of security by depending on external generators, or become active contributors to the global security architecture by securing autonomous, resilient energy systems.  The same could be said with the weaponization of chokepoints like oil and natural gas pipelines or key logistical corridors, which may be used to manipulate prices, politics, or both.

Ukraine’s experience is particularly instructive. In 1994, Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for the U.S., U.K., and Russia respecting its borders. Since then, Ukraine has relied heavily on nuclear energy for civilian power. Nuclear power plants provided substantial energy independence and contributed to national flourishing. 

The independence gained from these nuclear power plants is why they have become high-value targets in modern conflict. This is why attacks on Chernobyl and, more recently, Zaporizhzhya have had such devastating effects on Ukraine’s security. These  large, traditional nuclear plants — centralized and grid-dependent — are hard to replace. 

Are Small Modular Reactors the Answer? 

While Russia and China have long used nuclear energy exports as instruments of power, the U.S. has begun to frame advanced nuclear energy as a national security asset. Specifically, these assets are increasingly advanced nuclear reactors known as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). 

SMRs produce less than 300 megawatts of electricity, which is one-third of traditional reactors. They are factory-built, quicker to deploy, and designed with enhanced safety features. These reactors are introduced to produce electricity, desalination, industrial heat, and can be used for energy intensive activities like AI data centers. 

Shifting to SMRs matters. In contexts like Ukraine, which is vulnerable to a powerful energy supplier, localized and reliable nuclear power could stabilize fragile grids. SMRs can also displace carbon-intensive fuels like oil and gas. These small reactors may also play a significant role in reducing vulnerability to energy coercion, or the use of fuel supply cutoffs or price manipulation for political leverage. 

When deployed under stringent safety and nonproliferation standards, U.S.-designed SMRs offer more than clean electricity: They offer a pathway to resilience and autonomy in an increasingly contested global order.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s recent deal with the U.S. on critical minerals and SMR development carries strategic significance. It reinvigorated a lost power center in critical mineral mining that provided Ukraine with considerable leverage in trade and security. Deploying U.S.-designed SMRs as microgrid solutions for industrial facilities and critical mineral sites could support safer, more secure, and more efficient extraction and processing, while strengthening transparent supply to global markets.

SMRs Introduce Security during Times of Crisis

 SMRs offer practical, long-term solutions for countries reliant on interdependent pipelines and energy systems with adversarial neighbors. 

SMRs are modular and adaptable and can be deployed in a wider range of environments. Their enhanced safety features, faster construction timelines, and scalability make SMRs attractive for countries seeking alternatives to oil and gas, energy security, and new economic opportunities. 

SMRs provide an energy solution that can cultivate national resilience. Prioritized across allied networks, SMRs can reduce the geopolitical weaponization of energy while strengthening grid resilience. For example, in partnership with the U.S., Ukraine’s Project Phoenix is considering how replacing war-damaged thermal plants with SMRs may serve to strengthen long-term grid resilience and prevent future infrastructure attacks. 

SMRs may also serve as a useful solution to address structural weaknesses in today’s energy systems, particularly in rural areas. Many rural communities remain underserved and therefore rely heavily on carbon-intensive fuels. Relying on oil and gas can be politically fraught and unreliable, particularly when supply chains are disrupted. This leaves energy systems vulnerable to disruptions from military conflict to pandemics and natural disasters. Because SMRs are assembled centrally before deployment and use relatively small volumes of nuclear fuel, deploying multiple facilities can expand reliable access during crises and strengthen national or industrial autonomy.

Given the growing interest in micro- and nano-modular reactors across the defence and space sectors, SMRs should be financially sustainable too. SMRs involve higher upfront fuel costs but relatively low operating and maintenance expenses over time. Therefore, shifting from traditional energy systems to SMRs calls for more innovative financing and stronger public–private partnership models. 

SMRs are also increasingly relevant to the infrastructure demands of artificial intelligence. Western technology companies are struggling to meet surging electricity needs for data centers while reducing dependence on adversarial suppliers of the critical minerals used in chips and computing equipment. Expanded SMR deployment could support more energy-secure mining and processing, strengthen transparent global supply chains, and help counter predatory and corrupt practices by China and Russia in developing regions.

First commercial SMRs are expected to come online by 2030. The world may not be safer by then, and aggressive revisionist autocracies will not abandon their ambitions. But if democracies can build a coordinated, holistic approach to this transformative technology, they can avoid the risk of SMRs becoming the next “silver atom” that fails to deliver.